

## Message Text

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 191313

TOSEC 61

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, FR, US

SUBJECT: RUSH-GALLEY CONVERSATION, TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 25

DELIVER ONLY TO EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

1. FOLLOWING IS UNCLEARED MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN DEPUTY SECRETARY AND FRENCH DEFENSE MINISTER GALLEY ON SEPTEMBER 25 WHICH THE SECRETARY MAY FIND HELPFUL FOR HIS LUNCHEON WITH FOREIGN MINISTER JOBERT.

2. THE DEPUTY SECRETARY INDICATED THAT WE HAVE BEEN ATTEMPTING TO PROMOTE GOOD BILATERAL RAPPORT WITH FRANCE. IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT WE WORK WELL TOGETHER IN THE MILITARY AS WELL AS IN THE DIPLOMATIC AREA. WE HAVE EXCELLENT COLLABORATION BETWEEN OUR OFFICERS IN THE FIELD AND THERE IS A CERTAIN COLLABORATION IN THE NUCLEAR FIELD AS WELL. GALLEY READILY AGREED THAT BOTH OUR INTERESTS WERE SERVED BY THE MULTIPLICATION OF CONTACTS.

3. LEON SLOSS NOTED THAT IN THE MOORER-MAURIN TALKS, FURTHER STAFF TALKS HAD BEEN SUGGESTED. WE HOPED THAT CONFIDENTIAL

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THESE STAFF TALKS COULD BE FOLLOWED UP.

4. GALLEY SAID THAT WE HAD REACHED A POINT WHERE SUCH TALKS COULD BE EXTREMELY USEFUL. THE FRENCH WERE BE-

GINNING TO DEVELOP A SERIOUS TACTICAL NUCLEAR FORCE.  
THERE WOULD SOON BE A CERTAIN NUMBER OF TACTICAL NUCLEAR

WEAPONS FOR FRENCH FIGHTER AIRCRAFT AND FOR THE FRENCH  
GROUND FORCES. THIS INTRODUCTION POSED PROBLEMS OF  
COOPERATION THAT HAVE TO BE DISCUSSED FRANKLY.

5. THE DEPUTY SECRETARY EXPLAINED THAT THE ADMINISTRATION  
HAD NO INTENTION OF REDUCING OUR FORCES IN EUROPE EXCEPT  
AS MIGHT BE AGREED IN MBFR TALKS. THE DOMESTIC POLITICAL  
PRESSURES TO REDUCE WERE ENORMOUS HOWEVER. THE MANSFIELD  
AMENDMENT WOULD COME TO A VOTE THIS WEEK; WHILE IT WAS  
PROBLEMATIC WHETHER IT WOULD PASS THE SENATE IT WOULD  
PROBABLY NOT PASS IN THE HOUSE. BURDEN-SHARING WAS ALSO  
A FACTOR IN CONGRESSIONAL THINKING; THE NUNN AND JACKSON  
AMENDMENTS STIPULATED THAT US TROOPS WERE TO BE REDUCED BY  
THE EXTENT THAT A BALANCE OF PAYMENTS GAP EXISTED. WE  
HAVE NOW PRETTY WELL CONVINCED THE CONGRESS THAT WE WOULD  
NOT SAVE MONEY BY TROOP WITHDRAWALS AND THAT THE KEY  
ELEMENT IS NOW SOLELY THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS. SENATOR  
MANSFIELD AND OTHERS HAD SHIFTED FROM ARGUMENTS BASED ON  
COST-SAVING TO ARGUMENTS BASED ON THE PRINCIPLE THAT WE  
SHOULD NOT HAVE TROOPS OVERSEAS AND THAT THEIR PRESENCE  
IN OTHER COUNTRIES WAS IMPERIALISTIC. WE TRY TO CONVINCE  
THE CONGRESS OF THE SPECIOUSNESS OF THIS, THAT WE KEEP OUR  
TROOPS IN EUROPE BECAUSE THEY ARE WANTED THERE, BUT THE  
OPPOSITION IS WIDESPREAD.

6. THE DEPUTY SECRETARY CONCLUDED THAT, WITH THIS  
DOMESTIC BACKGROUD, MBFR WAS IMPORTANT TO US TO ENABLE US  
TO RESIST PRESSURES FOR UNILATERAL WITHDRAWAL, AND TO MAKE  
TROOP WITHDRAWALS FROM EUROPE ONLY ON A RECIPROCAL BASIS,  
THUS MAINTAINING RELATIVE EQUALITY. MBFR WAS IN NO  
WAY A COVER FOR THE US UNILATERALLY TO WITHDRAW.

7. GALLEY RESPONDED THAT WITHOUT REPEATING THE WELL-  
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KNOWN FRENCH POSITION, HE WANTED TO MAKE SOME PERSONAL  
OBSERVATION ON WHY THE FRENCH OPPOSED OR EXPRESSED  
RESERVATIONS ABOUT MBFR. INITIALLY, THE ARGUMENTS OF  
THE BRITISH, GERMANS AND OTHERS HAD BEEN THAT IF THE US  
REDUCED ITS TROOPS IN EUROPE, THEY WOULD BE REQUIRED TO  
INCREASE THEIR FORCE LEVELS. NOW THE PICTURE IS THE  
REVERSE; BECAUSE OF THE DETENTE ATMOSPHERE AND POSSIBLE  
US REDUCTIONS, THIS WOULD BE A MARVELOUS OCCASION FOR THE  
EUROPEANS TO REDUCE THEIR OWN FORCE LEVELS. THIS GENERAL  
DEMobilIZATION WOULD CLEARLY BE PREJUDICIAL TO THE EF-  
FORTS OF THE ALLIANCE. GALLEY OBSERVED THAT AS THE US  
GOES INTO THE MBFR TALKS, THE FRENCH WOULD BE INCREASING  
THEIR MILITARY BUDGET BY 12 PER CENT.

8. THE DEPUTY SECRETARY AGREED THIS WAS A SOUND ANALYSIS POINTING UP THE GREAT DANGER OF DETENTE. OUR EXPERIENCE HAS BEEN THAT THE USSR WOULD NOT FOLLOW OUR EXAMPLE. WE SET QUANTITATIVE LIMITS ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN 1966; THE SOVIETS INCREASED THEIR NUMBER. WE CUT OUR NATO FORCES BY ONE-THIRD; THE USSR INCREASED FROM 27 TO 31 DIVISIONS. WE CUT OUR MILITARY MANPOWER FROM 3.5 TO 2.2 MILLION WHILE THE SOVIETS INCREASED. THE SOVIETS HAVE DOUBLED THEIR MILITARY BUDGET IN 10 YEARS, INTRODUCED NEW WEAPONS SYSTEMS AND SIGNIFICANTLY ENLARGED THEIR TANK FORCES IN EUROPE. THIS IS VERY DANGEROUS SINCE DETENTE CAN ONLY BE SUCCESSFUL IF NEGOTIATED FROM STRENGTH. OUR POSITION IS DIFFERENT FROM THE FRENCH ONLY BECAUSE WE FEEL THAT THE RESULT OF MBFR CAN BE TO BIND THE USSR TO A REDUCTION AS WELL.

9. GALLEY NOTED THAT AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF PEACE IN EUROPE IS THE PRESENCE OF AMERICAN TROOPS IN THE AREA OF THE IRON CURTAIN. THERE ARE CURRENTLY 9 AMERICAN DIVISIONS AGAINST 23 SOVIET DIVISIONS. ANY AMERICAN REDUCTION NOW WOULD GO BELOW THE MINIMUM ACCEPTABLE THRESHOLD OF US PRESENCE.

10. THE DEPUTY SECRETARY NOTED THAT THE PROBLEM POSED  
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FOR US, AS A RESULT OF DOMESTIC PRESSURES, WAS HOW TO AVOID UNILATERAL REDUCTIONS AND OBTAIN MUTUAL REDUCTIONS INSTEAD.

11. GALLEY SAID HE WAS NOW EVEN MORE WORRIED. THE FRENCH DID NOT CONSIDER THAT FORCES WERE EQUAL NOW. THE PENTAGON BRIEFING HAD NOT CONVINCED HIM THAT THEY WERE; SECRETARY SCHLESINGER HAD SAID THAT THE DIFFERENCES WERE NOT AS GREAT AS MANY MADE OUT, BUT THEY WERE STILL APPRECIABLE. A LINEAR CUT IN US FORCES NOW WOULD LEAD TO FURTHER WEAKNESS. THE CONGRESS SHOULD BE AWARE THAT FURTHER CUTS WOULD LEAD TO THE NEUTRALIZATION OF EUROPE.

12. THE DEPUTY SECRETARY NOTED THAT OUR GOALS IN MBFR WOULD INCLUDE A COMMON CEILING; IN ANY CASE WE WOULD NOT COME OUT OF MBFR WITH ANY RESULT WORSE THAN WHEN WE WENT IN.

13. GALLEY SAID THE FRENCH INTUITIVELY CONSIDERED THAT THE SOVIETS, REGARDLESS OF THE PAPER OUTCOME, WOULD SOMEHOW AND SOME WAY, COME OUT OF MBFR WITH A NET ADVANTAGE.

THE FRENCH WERE NOT ABLE APPRECIABLY TO INCREASE THE NUMBER OF THEIR ARMED FORCES. THEY WERE THEREFORE ATTEMPTING TO ENHANCE THEIR CAPABILITY THROUGH QUALITATIVE MEANS; E.G. EQUIPPING FIGHTER AIRCRAFT WITH TACTICAL NUCLEAR

WEAPONS, REPLACING ARTILLERY WITH NUCLEAR MISSILES.

14. THE DEPUTY SECRETARY NOTED SOME OF OUR OWN CONTEMPORATED QUALITATIVE WEAPONS IMPROVEMENT, BUT CONCLUDED THAT DEMOCRACIES WERE GREATLY HANDICAPPED IN A PERIOD OF DETENTE.

15. GALLEY AGREED OBSERVING HOWEVER THAT AN ERROR IN DETENTE WAS FOR WORSE THAN A SIMPLE ERROR IN ARITHMETIC.

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